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INTERNET-OF-THINGS DEVICES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, VENTURE CAPITAL, CHINA 
MANUFACTURING, AND THE ART OF A CLEAN DEAL: 
WHO OWNS WHAT? 
Chris Carr† & Dan Harris‡  
Much of the value of an Internet-of-Things (“IoT”) 
startup resides in its intellectual property. Many IoT startups 
use China, mainly Shenzhen, to develop, manufacture, and ship 
their product.  
Though this strategy provides many benefits, it also 
presents substantial challenges. IoT entrepreneurs often fail to 
ask the right initial questions of their Chinese manufacturer or 
take the basic legal steps needed to ensure they can track, retain 
and verify ownership of their own IP. This situation makes 
investors nervous and can greatly complicate the raising of 
initial or subsequent rounds of capital. At the micro-level, this 
article discusses the IP risks for foreign IoT startups that 
develop and manufacture their devices in China and offers 
strategic recommendations for how to manage that process to 
achieve a clean deal for investors and ultimately a meaningful 
liquidity event. At the macro-level, we highlight how 
intellectual property law and contract law can be leveraged to 
help drive the development of ecosystems in finance, 
entrepreneurship, and supply chain. 
                                                             
† Chris Carr, J.D., is a business law professor and former associate dean in the Orfalea College of 
Business at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. He teaches courses on U.S. and international business law 
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recently he served as the 2016–2017 Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Business at the University 
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‡ Dan Harris, J.D., is a founder and partner with Harris Bricken, a Seattle-based boutique 
international law firm. Dan mostly represents companies doing business in emerging markets. He 
writes and speaks extensively on Chinese law, with a focus on protecting foreign businesses in 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investor and consumer interest in Internet-of-Things (“IoT”) 
startups and the size of their potential markets remains strong. From 
2012 to 2016, venture capitalists poured over $4 billion USD into these 
startups,1 and that number is expected to grow well into the future.2 
Some analysts predict that 20 to 30 billion IoT devices will be 
connected to the Internet by 2020,3 with a potential impact on the global 
economy of up to $6.2 trillion by 2025.4 
China, Shenzhen in particular, is home to thousands of companies 
providing a wide range of services to foreign IoT startups, including 
the design and production of semiconductors, IoT modules, subsystems 
and finished devices. Shenzhen’s ecosystem includes suppliers of 
components, equipment, personnel, chemicals, wafers and product 
packaging—in short, pretty much everything one would need to build 
and ship an IoT product to any part of the world.5 
Many foreign IoT startups are making the pilgrimage to Shenzhen 
to take advantage of this rich ecosystem.6 As China lawyers advising 
these companies, we regularly see IoT products that have reached the 
mass production stage and need to be produced quickly and in large 
quantities. Now that it has a commercial product, the startup seeks 
financing. The wise angel, venture capitalist, or private equity firm 
asks, “But who really owns the intellectual property in the product? Do 
you own it? Will or does the Chinese manufacturer/factory in Shenzhen 
own it? Or does some third party own all or part of it?” 
Investors like clean deals, and intellectual property stability and 
predictability are important to them.7  IP-intensive industries have more 
                                                             
 1. See Steve Myers, As Connected Hardware Matures, Investors Pour More Funding Into 
Fewer Companies, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 6, 2017), http://bit.do/Myers_InvestorsPour. 
 2. See Christine Magee, VCs Look to the Future as IoT Investments Soar, TECHCRUNCH 
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://bit.do/Magee_VCs-look-future. 
 3. See Harald Bauer et al., The Internet of Things: Sizing Up the Opportunity, MCKINSEY 
& CO. (Dec. 2014), http://bit.do/Bauer_IoT; Chris Ip, McKinsey & Company, Address at the 
Hong Kong IoT Conference: IoT Opportunity – Are You Ready to Capture a Once-in-a- Lifetime 
Value Pool? (June 21, 2016), http://bit.do/IP_IoT-Opportunity; John Greenough, How the 
'Internet of Things' Will Impact Consumers, Businesses, and Governments in 2016 and Beyond, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 18, 2016), http://bit.do/Greenough_IoT; VERIZON, STATE OF THE MARKET: 
INTERNET OF THINGS (2016), http://bit.do/Verizon_State-of-the-Market. 
 4. See Bauer et al., supra note 3; Ip, supra note 3. 
 5. See David Lam, The Internet of Things Connects Silicon Valley to Shenzhen, 
KNECT365 FIN. (Apr. 13, 2016), http://bit.do/Lam_IoT. 
 6. See Ryan Matthew Pierson, Shenzhen Playing a Strong Hand in the Global IoT Game, 
READWRITE (May 16, 2016), http://bit.do/Pierson_Shenzhen; Lam, supra note 5. 
 7. See Mary Juetten, Do Venture Capitalists Care About Intellectual Property?, FORBES 
(Aug. 11, 2015), http://bit.do/Juetten_Do-VCs-Care. 
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than doubled the sales and capital spending of non-IP-intensive 
industries, and wages are more than 50% higher in IP-intensive 
industries.8 Further, for early-stage companies, intangible assets can 
account for as much as 80% of their value.9 
It is often awkward for the (usually) young entrepreneur to have 
to answer these important IP questions from investors. With the rise of 
IoT devices, these questions have become even more difficult to 
answer in a definitive way. The purpose of this article is to assist 
academic scholars in law and business, their students, legal 
practitioners, policymakers, entrepreneurs and investors to better 
understand the relevant history, issues, and risks related to making an 
IoT product in China and provide strategic recommendations to move 
forward. 
I. SOURCING FROM CHINA: RELEVANT HISTORY 
How did we get to this point? The process has worked its way 
through the following general stages. 
A. Stage One – The Gold Old Days (circa 1981 to 1995) 
Here, the landscape was pretty straightforward and simple, and 
there were two scenarios. In the first scenario, the Chinese 
manufacturer made standard consumer products. The U.S. buyer 
simply purchased that product and would ask the Chinese manufacturer 
to take the additional step of putting the trademark/logo of the U.S. 
buyer on the product or its packaging. In this case, intellectual property 
ownership was clear: the Chinese manufacturer owned the design of 
the product while the U.S. customer owned the trademark/logo. In the 
second scenario, the product was the U.S. buyer’s already well-
developed and established product. The buyer arrived at the doorstep 
of the Chinese manufacturer with its already completed product in 
hand, and then entered into a contract with the Chinese manufacturer 
to make a large number of copies. Here, ownership of the IP was also 
straightforward and clear: the Chinese manufacturer owned nothing, 
and the U.S. buyer owned all of the product’s intellectual property. 
The simplicity of this relationship helped give rise to the lazy 
practice of memorializing the entire manufacturing relationship 
                                                             
 8. See Nam D. Pham, The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property 
Rights on U.S. Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages and Exports, NDP CONSULTING (Apr. 
2010), http://bit.do/Pham_Impact; Kristina Lybecker, IP Protection is Key to U.S. Job Creation, 
IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 23, 2015), http://bit.do/Lybecker_IP-Protection. 
 9. Mary Juetten, Pay Attention to Innovation and Intangibles – They’re More Than 80% 
Of Your Business’ Value, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2014), http://bit.do/Juetten_Pay-Attention. 
2018] INTERNET-OF-THINGS DEVICES  319 
through simple Purchase Orders (“POs”).10 More complex legal 
agreements such as an NNN Agreement, Product Development 
Agreement or OEM Agreement (more on each of these agreements 
below) were rarely used, since the ownership of the IP was clear and 
the PO took care of the price and delivery terms. In most cases this 
relaxed approach was sufficient. 
B. Stage Two (circa 1995 to 2015) 
During this stage a new iteration of the relationship evolved. U.S 
buyers started to arrive in China with no completed product in hand, 
just the idea for the product. The U.S. buyer would then work to co-
develop the idea or proposal into a product, alongside the Chinese 
manufacturer. Normally, the Chinese manufacturer would offer to 
perform all the development work at its own expense, with the 
understanding that it would later be selected and used by the U.S. buyer 
to exclusively mass produce the product. 
This co-development process also often relied on the same relaxed 
“purchase order only” approach discussed in Stage One. This approach 
in turn gave rise to many of the issues we see today that make 
answering the “who owns what” question so difficult. For example, 
who owned the product design? What about the molds and tooling? 
Who owned the various manufacturing trade secrets? If the buyer chose 
to place the product with another factory other than the one who co-
designed the product, what was owed to the initial 
manufacturer/factory that spent its own money to co-develop the 
product? To what extent did the initial manufacturer/factory need to 
satisfy the buyer’s price and quantity requirements? If the manufacturer 
ended its relationship with the buyer and then made the product under 
the its own trademark/logo, was that permissible? 
Absent the right legal agreements, these were difficult questions 
to answer. However, in such vague situations, and as our prior research 
addressed and established, the Chinese factory would likely prevail in 
the event of a dispute between the parties over such issues.11 
  
                                                             
 10. We label this the “lazy approach” because, contrary to urban legend, the PO is not a 
contract in the traditional sense; it is only the placing of one order. Thus, IoT entrepreneurs should 
not rely on a PO to save them. See the more detailed discussion on POs in Part II infra.   
 11. See Chris Carr & Dan Harris, Strategic Contracting in China for Foreign Firms, 57 
THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 241 (2015) [hereinafter Strategic Contracting]; Chris Carr & Dan 
Harris, Contracting in China: A Contract Worth the Paper It’s Written On, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 
REV. 28-33 (2015) [hereinafter Contracting in China]. 
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C. Stage Three (circa 2015 to Today) 
Now we are at the beginning of the “boomtown” IoT era. Yet, in 
the design, development, and manufacturing of devices for the IoT 
market, the problem-filled relationships of the Stage Two era have only 
become more prevalent. Further, a whole new set of issues has arisen. 
During the Stage Two era, we could usually count on the simplicity of 
having only two entities that worked together to design and 
manufacture the product. In this third and current IoT era, the 
proverbial design and manufacturing kitchen has become even more 
crowded. For example, in many of the IoT startups we have seen the 
last two or three years, the design-development-manufacturing process 
has expanded to include the following:  
• A product “concept” from the U.S. buyer. 
• An international design firm handling the external design 
of the product. 
• The internal design and function of the product being 
owned and handled by: 
o The U.S. buyer; 
o The Chinese manufacturer; and/or 
o The company who provided the components 
or sensors required to connect the IoT device 
to outside networks. 
• The design of the IoT product “app” (usually for a smart 
phone). This can involve two separate sets of software: 
the communication sending software found on the IoT 
product and the communication receiving software which 
resides in possibly multiple forms. And as with internal 
design, these software components may be written by 
different parties: a third-party software design firm, the 
U.S. buyer and/or the Chinese manufacturer.12   
So now consider: the product is ready, manufacturing needs to 
commence, and the startup pursues funding. The experienced funding 
source then asks, “Who owns this IoT product? Who owns its 
underlying IP?” We have found that when we ask the startup and its 
founder these questions, they often do not know. Further, their initial 
seed investors and/or companies they outsourced to do not know either. 
As you can imagine, the “Good question. I’m not sure” response 
is not acceptable to seasoned and mature investors. When the startup 
                                                             
 12. See ERRAN CARMEL & PAUL TJIA, The Offshore Landscape, in OFFSHORING 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: SOURCING AND OUTSOURCING TO A GLOBAL WORKFORCE 3, 3-30 
(2005).  
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and its founder are pressed to answer these questions, they usually have 
to admit it’s not clear who owns what. 
The overall message here is that as development and 
manufacturing of IoT devices becomes more diffuse and complex, it is 
even more important to turn to well-written legal agreements that can 
help answer such questions in advance. It is risky to devote time, 
energy, and money to build an IoT product that may in whole or in part 
be owned by someone else. 
II. THE STANDARD SCENARIO 
Today, the usual situation often plays out as follows. A foreign 
product designer-startup comes to China to select and then work with 
a Chinese manufacturer, probably in Shenzhen,13 to commercialize 
their IoT product. In this co-development setting, the foreign startup 
and its Chinese counterpart cooperate to build a prototype of the 
product that can be commercialized. But no written contract is used; 
the work is again (lazily) memorialized using a Purchase Order. 
The parties’ development cycle moves along, and the Chinese 
manufacturer eventually completes the needed prototype. It retains the 
prototype, and looks forward to beginning the manufacturing phase, 
where it can finally start to generate meaningful revenue. However, as 
the relationship evolves into the manufacturing phase, something will 
usually go wrong.  
Two things often go wrong. First, the Chinese 
manufacturer/factory announces to the foreign IoT startup that the 
projected unit price for the product will need to substantially increase 
or it will be unable to meet delivery date or quantity requirements for 
the product. Or secondly, when the factory makes the product, 
substantial product defect and quality control issues appear.14  
As these problems appear, the foreign startup confronts its 
Chinese counterpart and takes the position that it is going to take its 
prototype and have it manufactured by another factory, also probably 
located in or near Shenzhen. The Chinese manufacturer replies, in 
effect, 
No way. You can’t do that. We own the product’s IP, and we 
agreed to manufacture the product for you exclusively so long 
as you were willing to order on our terms. You cannot now 
take the prototype to somebody else. We have the sole right 
to manufacture this product, and, if you don’t make good on 
                                                             
 13. Regarding the draw of Shenzhen, see discussion accompanying notes 1-6, supra. 
 14. See MIKE BELLAMY, THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE GUIDE TO CHINA SOURCING: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO COMMON PITFALLS AND BEST PRACTICES (2014). 
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your promises of being able to make substantial sales, we will 
terminate our relationship and just make and market the 
product ourself. 
In this situation, the problem is that in China, absent a written 
contract that expressly and clearly states the contrary, the Chinese party 
is probably correct in its legal position concerning the new product and 
its IP.15 Further, the Purchase Order is not a contract in the traditional 
sense; it is simply the placing of an order. So, unless a PO speaks to 
intellectual property (which is quite rare), it is not going to help the 
startup here. In fact, in China, some courts do not see POs as a contract 
at all and/or will not even consider a document that is not in Chinese.16 
This sad ending for the foreign IoT startup—a scenario where it 
loses everything it has been focused on for months or even years—
results from its failure to think through and properly document the co-
development process. 
III. MOVING FORWARD: LAW MEETS IP STRATEGY 
There is still a lot of skepticism in business about China and the 
enforceability of contracts there. Several of our clients remain 
convinced that legal does not matter in China. But that is simply not 
true. As we have written and shown in prior research, it makes sense to 
have the right business contract in place for reasons of clarity, breach 
prevention, and enforceability.17 Further, and as we have also 
established in previous research, historical data and indicators suggest 
that, though China’s still-emerging legal system is far from perfect, 
China has come a long way and is much more effective in handling 
commercial contract disputes than most people think.18 This positive 
development and shift are also consistent with the literature, which 
predicts that, as legal enforceability improves in a country, rational 
actors will shift away from relying on traditional mechanisms, such as 
trust and relationships (i.e., guanxi), and move towards explicit 
contracts to safeguard their exchanges from business and market 
risks.19 
                                                             
 15. See Carr & Harris, Strategic Contracting, supra note 11; Carr & Harris, Contracting 
in China, supra note 11. 
 16. This is beyond the scope of this article, but in short, the ideal document is a bilingual 
Chinese language contract sealed and “chopped” by the Chinese company. See id. 
 17. Id. For Plaintiffs, Some Courts in China Are Getting Better, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 
2017), http://bit.do/Economist_Plaintiffs-China. 
 18. Id. See Chris Carr & Dan Harris, China Supply Chain Contracts: The Contract 
(Liquidated) Damages Provision, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://bit.do/Carr_China-Supply [hereinafter China Supply Chain Contracts]. 
 19. See Kevin Zheng Zhou & Dean Xu, How Foreign Firms Curtail Local Supplier 
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What then, should a foreign IoT startup do to avoid losing its 
hardware/product in China? The short answer is, first, ask the right 
questions, and second, use the right bilingual legal documents and IP 
registrations to implement the answers to those questions. 
A. Threshold Questions to Get Started 
This is not an exhaustive list, but here are some initial important 
questions that the foreign IoT startup should ask itself and its Chinese 
manufacturer when getting started: 
1. Who Does What, When?  
Have you both clearly agreed on what will be done, who is 
responsible for what, and when each task should be done? This requires 
a detailed description and statement of the product to be designed and 
the work that needs to be performed. In China, too many product design 
projects fail because the parties do not know what is going on or they 
have not set expectations, and after a year or two of development, no 
progress is made on the prototype. 
2. Costs, Allocation, Dates?  
You both clearly agreed on the costs, the allocation of those costs 
and also the payment dates for those costs? What exactly will be 
provided by the Chinese manufacturer in return for your payments? 
This portion of the agreement and understanding should also typically 
address molds, tooling, software, design, the specifications for any 
working model, etc. 
3. Return of IP?  
If the project fails, have you both clearly agreed that all tangible 
and intangible materials and IP developed during the project need to be 
transferred over to you, the foreign IoT startup? These materials should 
not be retained by the Chinese manufacturer and designer under any 
circumstances. If your agreement is silent on the issue, chances are high 
that your Chinese counterpart gets to keep these items. 
                                                             
Opportunism in China: Detailed Contracts, Centralized Control, and Relational Governance, 43 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 677 (2012); Kevin Zheng Zhou & Laura Poppo, Exchange Hazards, 
Relational Reliability, and Contracts in China: The Contingent Role of Legal Enforceability, 41 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 861 (2010); Rekha Krishnan et al., When Does Trust Matter to Alliance 
Performance?, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 894 (2006); Mike W. Peng, Institutional Transitions and 
Strategic Choices, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 275 (2003); Xueguang Zhou, Qiang Li, Wei Zhao, & 
He Cai, Embeddedness and Contractual Relationships in China's Transitional Economy, 68 AM. 
SOC. REV. 75 (2003). 
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4. Manufacturing Control?  
If the project is successful and a prototype is developed, do you 
still have the right to manufacture the product anywhere you want, 
anywhere in the world, with any factory you want? This is critical. The 
foreign IoT startup must retain its right to determine what factory will 
manufacture its device. While the parties may hope and dream that the 
manufacturing will take place in the co-developer’s factory, what if the 
manufacturer cannot provide an acceptable price, quantity, quality, or 
delivery date of the foreign IoT startup’s product? What if the Chinese 
counterpart takes the position three months later that due to unforeseen 
changes in the prices of its materials and supplies, it needs to raise the 
price to you? To maintain control, you must protect the right to 
manufacture your product with a factory of your choice, regardless of 
the reason. 
In short, the issue of the “right to manufacture” needs to be clearly 
understood and agreed upon by both sides before they focus on the 
more technical IP ownership details. The reason behind this is a 
practical one—we have found that every factory owner and every 
foreign IoT startup understands on a basic level manufacturing issues. 
If this is discussed and negotiated upfront, the IP landscape will shape 
and appear in a way both parties will also understand. Once the parties 
arrive at clarity on their manufacturing rights and obligations, the more 
mundane and technical IP issues and concerns become much easier and 
cleaner to address. If one waits to try and reach an understanding and 
agreement with one’s China counterpart on manufacturing rights after 
the product co-development process begins, one will have lost all or 
most of one’s leverage. In that situation, we have seen that the Chinese 
party can say no to one’s desire to maintain manufacturing control 
and/or it can raise manufacturing prices with near impunity. 
B. Legal Documents and Registrations to Implement Those 
Answers & IP Strategy 
Here is the list of the basic contracts and intellectual property 
registrations that can be used to ensure that ownership and other rights 
will be protected against the Chinese manufacturer and the rest of the 
world. Some situations may require only a few of these items; others 
will require more. 
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1. Non-Compete, Non-Circumvention, Non-
Disclosure (“NNN”) Agreements 
NNN agreements are bilingual agreements that protect 
confidentiality and prevent a Chinese counterpart from competing with 
a startup or going around the startup by working directly with its 
customers.20 This agreement makes sense before choosing the specific 
Chinese manufacturer, but many times this specific agreement may not 
be needed because it makes more sense to put the NNN’s substantive 
provisions into a well-drafted Product Manufacturing Agreement (see 
below). An NNN is a relatively simple agreement to draft but it must 
be done correctly to be effective. To be candid, the standard off-the-
shelf American and European NDA Agreements we see people use are 
worthless for China.21 
2. Mold/Tooling Ownership Agreements 
This is another basic bilingual agreement that makes clear the 
tooling and molds being made for the project do, in fact, belong to 
startup.22 Without this agreement, when the startup wants to move to a 
new manufacturer for its product, its prior manufacturer may try to 
keep its tooling and molds. And without this agreement, there is a high 
probability the old manufacturer will use its molds/tooling to then 
make said product and compete with the startup. Like the NNN 
agreement, this agreement oftentimes is not needed because it makes 
more sense to put the substantive provisions from a Mold/Tooling 
Ownership Agreement into the Product Manufacturing Agreement (see 
below). 
3. Product Ownership Agreement 
This bilingual agreement makes clear that the product co-
developed with the Chinese party belongs to the startup. Most 
importantly, the startup needs to have something in writing that is 
enforceable in both China and in other countries in which the startup 
sells or will sell its product.23 If it does not have this agreement in place, 
its Chinese manufacturer can claim ownership of the product’s IP. 
Even more disturbing, it may be able to register a design or utility 
patent on the product in China and in the other countries in which the 
                                                             
 20. Dan Harris, Want To Protect Your IP From China? Use An NNN Agreement, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Nov. 16, 2015, 11:02 AM), http://bit.do/Harris_Protect-IP. 
 21. See Carr & Harris, Strategic Contracting, supra note 11. 
 22. Dan Harris, Product Molds and Tooling in China: Three Things You Must Do To Hang 
On To Yours, CHINA L. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2015), http://bit.do/Harris_Product-Molds. 
 23. See Harris, supra note 20. 
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startup sells or might sell its product. Without this legal document 
signed by the Chinese manufacturer, it can accrue a variety of legal 
rights (in China and elsewhere) as to what the startup thought was its 
own product. Similar to the above, this agreement may not be needed 
if it makes more sense to move this content into a Product Development 
Agreement or Manufacturing Agreement (see below). 
4. Product Development Agreements (PDAs) 
These are often complicated agreements. PDAs define the 
boundaries of the product development relationship with the startup’s 
Chinese manufacturer, including who owns what and who pays for 
what in order to arrive at the finished product stage.24 These agreements 
make clear what the startup is paying for with respect to the product’s 
development and lays out the important metrics the Chinese 
counterpart must satisfy to get paid. At a minimum, a good PDA 
includes bilingual provisions addressing the following: 
• The product that will be developed, 
• The technology that the foreign IoT startup and Chinese 
manufacturer will contribute, 
• Who will provide the product specifications, and in what form, 
and 
• Who owns the IP rights to the finished product. 
5. China-Focused Manufacturing Agreements 
These are often called “OEM Agreements.” These agreements can 
also be complex. They are used to define the entire relationship 
between the startup and the Chinese manufacturer. It is rare not to 
require a good bilingual China-focused OEM Agreement. Among other 
things, these agreements usually address the following: 
• Quality requirements, 
• Time line and timeliness requirements, 
• Product and intellectual property ownership, 
• Mold/Tooling ownership, 
• Non-compete, non-circumvention, non-disclosure (NNN) 
requirements, 
• Sub-supplier expectations and requirements, and 
• Penalties for breaching (for example, liquidated damages).   
  
                                                             
 24. Steve Dickinson, Dan Harris, & Grace Yang, China Product Development Agreements, 
CHINA L. BLOG (Feb. 15, 2016), http://bit.do/Dickinson_China-Product. 
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6. China Trademark Registration 
When the startup’s IoT device is made in China and if its device 
or its packaging mentions the startup company, its brand name or logo, 
the startup simply must register the trademark in China. This is true 
even when the startup has no plans to sell the product in China. If the 
startup does not file its trademark for these items, someone else in 
China will likely do so. That someone else (for example, an 
unscrupulous competitor) may then have the power to stop the product 
from being made in China or from leaving China’s ports. 
7. China Invention and Design Patents 
If the startup’s IoT product is distinctive or innovative in either its 
design or function, the startup probably needs to pursue a Chinese 
patent. These patents protect its product from others who try to copy it 
in China. Further, they help prevent others from registering a patent on 
the startup’s product in China, which can then give others leverage to 
try and stop it from manufacturing its product in China or having its 
product leave from China’s ports. 
CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS 
The keys to IoT manufacturing in China are choosing the right 
legal agreements and the right IP registrations at the right time to 
maximize one’s protections while minimizing one’s costs. We 
mentioned earlier how U.S.- and European-style NDA Agreements 
simply do not work for China. Sadly, many other agreements we see 
drafted for China do not work either, for all sorts of reasons.25 We 
appreciate that startups are often strapped for cash and loathe to spend 
money on legal expenditures. However, at the end of the day, IoT 
startups cannot have it both ways. If they decide to manufacture their 
device in Shenzhen to take advantage of that facet of the global startup 
ecosystem, they need to accept and manage the challenges that comes 
with that decision. If a startup has or will raise hundreds of thousands 
of dollars (or usually more) to mass produce and scale its device, it has 
no excuse for not spending a small portion of those funds implementing 
the legal recommendations we discussed above. Wise investors will 
want to know that these details have or will be addressed. Doing so will 
be money well spent and the return will be a faster, better, and cleaner 
liquidity event for all involved. 
                                                             
 25. See Carr & Harris, Strategic Contracting, supra note 11; Carr & Harris, Contracting 
in China, supra note 11; Carr & Harris, China Supply Chain Contracts, supra note 18. 
